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“Kierkegaard and/or Catholicism: A matter of conjunctions”
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both-and approach in contrast to the either-or approach more characteristic of a Protestant sensibility. For example, Catholics tend to live with and argue for both scripture and tradition, faith and
works. The Danish Lutheran Søren Kierkegaard is often cited as a paradigm of Protestant either-or
thinking. In this seminar we will explore what we might learn not only about Catholicism and Kierkegaard, but even more about Christianity, human life, and the logic of conjunction.

William Cahoy is Dean of the School of Theology and Seminary and Associate Professor of Systematic

Theology at Saint John’s University in Collegeville, MN. A Catholic theologian, Professor Cahoy wrote
his dissertation at Yale University on Kierkegaard’s view of the self in community. He has published on
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Tradition, faith and the liberal arts, and faith and reason

How to apply: The seminar is open to all full-time faculty. Participants will receive a stipend of $500.00
for the seminar. Participating faculty will be expected to discuss certain texts and to write a short article
about the topic from their own perspective and discipline. These articles will be collected and disseminated on-line. Articles will be expected eight weeks after the end of the seminar. Fifteen faculty will be
accepted for the seminar, preference being given to those who have not participated in the past. Apply
by indicating your interest to Anthony Sciglitano, Religious Studies Department, at sciglian@shu.edu tel.
973-761-9544. Deadline for indicating interest is May 1, 2008.

This seminar is co-sponsored by the Center for Catholic Studies and the Center for Vocation and Servant Leadership at Seton Hall University. It is part of a series of such workshops focusing on the
notion of “calling” in the various disciplines.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Announcement…….……………………………………………………………..…2
On Knowing and Being:…….....………….….. …………………………………….4
Reflections on Truth, Love and Identity
Janine P. Buckner
Kierkegaard’s Dialectic and the…………...……………………………………...….7
Distrust of Intimacy
Ed Jones
Lonergan and Kierkegaard: Some Convergences..…………………………………..11
Richard M. Liddy
Kierkegaard’s Attack upon Assistant Professors:…………………………………....16
Proof of the Importance of Systematic Theology
Lawrence B. Porter
The Idea of Order in Soren Kierkegaard…………. .……………………………….21
John P. Wargacki
About the Participants…………………………...............................................................23

On Knowing and Being: Reflections on Truth, Love, and Identity
Janine P. Buckner
I am thrilled to have had the opportunity
to participate in the Center‘s Faculty seminar,
―Kierkegaard and/or Catholicism: A Matter of
Conjunctions‖ this May. The seminar, adeptly
facilitated by Dr. William Cahoy, Dean of the
School of Theology and Seminary at St. John‘s
University, was focused upon Søren Kierkegaard‘s
writings on Christianity, the human experience,
and the value of recognizing and maximizing individuals‘ responsibilities in relation to an absolute God. Faith is a central aspect of my life, and I
greatly enjoyed the discussions of Kierkegaard‘s
views that ensued in the gathering of my esteemed and erudite colleagues! Perhaps most rewarding for me was the time we had to share our
own definitions and perspectives with each other.
I found the seminar personally enlightening,
stimulating, and useful for some potential research projects, and am thrilled to have had the
ability to participate.
The seminar afforded me many benefits,
not the least of which was time to engage in discourse and learning at a level at which I have not
had the luxury to experience in many years. Indeed, the experience of being immersed with colleagues in such a stimulating atmosphere was a
rather luxurious one for me. Even though I was
teaching (the Psychology of Gender course) while
also reading and participating in the reflections
regarding Kierkegaard‘s views of the world and
the here-after, I felt as if I could go on forever in
that ―mode!‖ I am grateful for the wonderful experience, and I wish it could have continued. I
doubt that I am alone in this feeling; many of us
have hatched plans to continue in the fall what
discourses have already begun.
For me, the most exciting aspect of the
workshop was having the opportunity to be in the
student/learner role in exploring some of my
most favorite topics. (I used an entire notebook
for notes) In what seems like an eternity ago (!) I
enrolled as a college student in several courses on
the intersection of psychology and philosophy as
they relate to identity. At that time I was keenly
interested in the immersion of self in community,
and I enjoyed debates on principles such as
knowing truth versus being truth. In those seem-

ingly long-ago days, I even wrote a few papers on
the meaning-making processes of the human
mind (or psyche) as engaged in living a life of
faith (or doing a faith-full life, depending upon
the perspective). Regrettably, however, once I
began to specialize in the aspects of my professional expertise (research and theory of cognitive
development in Psychology), I necessarily had to
put some of these broader issues aside for the sake
of finishing graduate school (not to mention
forming my family and developing a professional
and personal life). Having an opportunity to revisit some of these deeper aspects has been reinvigorating and inspiring.
Perhaps the greatest value for me in this
workshop experience was the establishment of an
incubation period and subsequent ―repercolation‖ of schemas surrounding the meaning of personhood in a spiritual sense. Indeed,
some of Kierkegaard‘s ideas are echoed in some
foundational theories underlying developmental
psychology (particularly as these structures relate
to identity development and moral reasoning).
Many of Kierkegaard‘s ideas map directly onto
my own personal views, and could be useful for
developing a set of hypotheses for research. In
fact, some of the seminar content with which we
contended has stimulated new ideas which I hope
to incorporate into upcoming research projects.
For instance, I would like to explore how students
who are still engaged in self-discovery come to
terms with such issues as what it means to both
be and live as a Christian, by asking them to share
narratives about meaningful moments in their
lives. Through such avenues, I may gain insight
into not only what characteristics maturing students endorse or strive to acquire according to
the values of a religious worldview or culture, but
whether (or how) a developing sense of self as a
spiritual person is defined or shaped by these
such schemas of knowledge. Many constructs
could be useful in an endeavor of this kind; moreover, such work could lend itself in valuable ways
to practical applications in a place like Seton Hall
where students, staff, faculty, and administrators
are encouraged to consider vocation, personal
development, commitment to missions and values, and a life of faith.

Of all the topics that we discussed, the
most exciting potential for specific research relates to the ideas of the 3 stages of being, or what
we as a group called the ―3-ring circus‖ of life.
This is particularly intriguing to me as a narrative
researcher with developmental interests. My appreciation for this construct comes from the utility of this notion as a method for identifying the
predominate focus of one‘s life story. One ―ring‖
that Kierkegaard likened to a beginning stage of
life, or a default mode into which one is born, is a
lifestyle built upon the ―Aesthetic.‖ This type of
living may be seen at any age but is most pronounced in young children, and prioritizes the
pursuit of pleasure and avoiding pain. This lifestyle is fruitless as it is not ultimately possible to
maintain; since pleasure is but a fleeting experience, much like music—once the notes are gone,
so too is the pleasure associated with it. Although
some may be deluded in thinking that they can
commit to a life of pleasure, they in essence
merely relegate themselves to a life of instability,
since such individuals live a life of perpetual disappointment as they shift from one momentary
pleasure in search of another more fruitful
―place‖ to grow.
The second stage or perspective focuses
upon the ―Ethical‖ and is equally as unfulfilling
as striving for constant pleasure. Persons in an
―Ethical‖ mode commit to following laws and
strive for goodness and constancy, regardless of
emotion or intention. This kind of life is about
―self‖ and human-crafted laws to follow, but this
view leads to boredom as motivations to live and
do are essentially external in nature, based upon
doing what an authority figure commands, simply because it is right (or wrong). In the spiritual
dimension, Kierkegaard likens this to individuals
attempting to follow the Old Testament laws
which were unattainable in and of themselves.
Such a life binds one to feeling hopeless in the
realization that he or she could not perfectly perform all of the commands of the Law of Holiness.
The third and last stage, which Kierkegaard labeled as the ―Religious‖ life is one of hope and
maturity; it is uniquely motivated by an individual‘s desire and intention to follow after God‘s
Will. This stage is a collaborative effort between
individuals and God; on the human side, individuals must recognize that in and of themselves
they would never achieve or know what is perfection or truth, so they must choose to submit

themselves to the Grace of God to help shape
their lives and instruct their choices. In this
realm, the individual shifts to a more ―mature‖
development, demonstrating a conviction to place
the Will of God at the center point of who one
strives to be (call it identity, becoming a self,
meaning making, development, or what-haveyou, depending upon the discipline through
which one labels such constructs). I have been
thinking some about this construct and hope to
talk with colleagues about ways to potentially incorporate this into some kind of narrative inquiry
project. One means of using this triarchic model
would be to look for themes reflective of these
three perspectives in individuals‘ descriptions
about meaningful moments or turning points in
their lives.
What kinds of stories would
―aesthetically-tuned‖ individuals tell, and how
would these differ from those concentrated upon
―ethical concerns‖ or those more in a ―religious‖
mode? How might such themes be related to successful or unsuccessful coping, or outcomes in
cases where either positive or negative experiences (even stress) occur.
Besides the potential for informing research, a different aspect of the seminar which I
found probably most gratifying of all was the
multidisciplinary context into which we, as participants, placed our discussions.
My coparticipants in the seminar represented a wide
range of fields, from Math to English, Seminary to
Chemistry. This broad base was wonderful and
led to deep interchanges regarding postmodernism, definitions of the Aesthetic, what is
meant by vocation, Culture & Christendom, authority, truth and Truth (with a Capital ―T‖), and
materiality. I believe that we all came to the understanding that each of us, living in community
with others, and fashioning a life well-lived in the
face of an ever-changing and relativistic culture,
must individually strive to discover and understand some kind of spiritual reality, one which
everyone may not readily comprehend in our
own subjective humanness. Kierkegaard‘s view
on this spiritual reality was one of an objective
truth, one that unfortunately is necessarily somewhat ―colored‖ by our own viewpoints and
knowledge. Nonetheless, he urged us to consider
that there is a God-reality that exists, even if as
humans we do not readily ―see it.‖ To this end,
we discussed several times the metaphor of looking through glasses to correct faulty vision. A
person with nearsightedness, for instance, only

―sees‖ the distant world as blurry, though in reality it is not blurry. But unless this person is informed by a mediator (an ophthalmologist) that
they need corrected vision, they may not realize
the potential that their sight could have. In this
sense, Kierkegaard referred to the human condition as seeing only dimly without the awakening
and spiritual adjustment that comes via the Spirit
of God. In effect, he spoke of being a Christian
without a true relationship with God like living
without the awareness of the ultimate reality beyond our visual perception. To exemplify this we
spoke about the passage of scripture in 1 Corinthians 13:11-12, where the Apostle Paul speaks
of these human limits in contrast to the standard,
true depth of knowing found in God:
When I was a child, I spoke as a child,
I understood as a child, I thought as a
child; but when I became a man, I put
away childish things. For now we see
in a mirror, dimly, but then face to
face. Now I know in part, but then I
shall know just as I also am known. (1
Cor. 13: 11-12, NKJV)

Another, more contemporary biblical translation
states it thus:
When I was an infant at my mother's
breast, I gurgled and cooed like any
infant. When I grew up, I left those
infant ways for good. We don't yet see
things clearly. We're squinting in a
fog, peering through a mist. But it
won't be long before the weather
clears and the sun shines bright! We'll
see it all then, see it all as clearly as
God sees us, knowing him directly just
as he knows us! But for right now,
until that completeness, we have three
things to do to lead us toward that
consummation: Trust steadily in God,
hope unswervingly, love extravagantly. And the best of the three is
love. (1 Cor. 13:11-13, The Message)

In the end, much of what our discussion focused
upon was this Love—what it is, how to recognize
it, where to find it, how to display it, how human
forms may differ from spiritual forms of love, and
so on. What I took away from these discussions
was not only relevant to myself as a cognitive developmental psychologist, but to a person striving
to be more than what I am now. Likewise, I enjoyed getting to know others through their own

As participants, we represented a wide
range of spiritual beliefs with many different potential definitions of love, and we spent a good
amount of time considering how subjective mentality in itself may hinder efforts to fully grasp
ultimate, objective reality in which we live and
love. Though we didn‘t take a vote on how many
of us believe in an ―objective reality‖ beyond
what we know and experience individually, what
we did share in common is that we no doubt see
dimly in our human condition, and often lack
enlightenment as to reality beyond our moments
of being that demand our attention. This is one
reason why discourse from so many different
scholarly domains was enlightening to me. And I
know too well, like everyone, how the nowdemands of many different roles often consume
much of my focus, energies, and perceptions. As
such, I have many perspectives or glasses that I
myself often take on and off throughout the day.
If for no other reason, this is probably the single
largest contributor to my pleasure in being given
the opportunity to step away for a few hours in
the seminar days to re-calibrate my world- and
self-views.
_________________________________________
(n.d.). The Message (1 Cor. 13:11-13). Retrieved July 22,
2008 from Web site: http://www.biblegateway.com/
passage/?search=1%20Corinthians%2013%
20;&version=65;

Kierkegaard’s Dialectic and the Distrust of Intimacy
Ed Jones

In the material we read of Kierkegaard last
May, he comes across a bit as an Old Testament
prophet—maybe not a righteous avenger, but
outraged believer railing against the state of the
Danish Church, and probably for good reason.
He is incensed—almost flabbergasted—that Denmark can consider its priests priests when they‘re
wrapped in earthly comforts and rewarded with
earthly powers. He sees the Danish Christian as
nothing like the New Testament Christian (Attack
upon Christendom).
In this sense, he is part of a long tradition
of prophets, among whom I would count Jesus,
who earned the wrath of Pharisees and Sadducees
for his sharp criticism of their hypocrisy. Such
righteousness revels in setting up sharp contrasts
between behavior that will lead to the Kingdom of
Heaven and behavior that will lead in another
direction. In one of Jesus‘ most stark expressions
of the choices that we have to make he declares
For I have come to set a man against is father,
a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law, and a
man‘s foes will be those of his own household.
He who loves father or mother more than me
is not worthy of me, and he who loves son or
daughter more than me is not worthy of me
(Mt 10: 35-37).

So Kierkegaard is hardly a radical when it
comes to framing earthly behavior in light of the
perspective of eternity. However, there is still
something odd about his brand of either/or
thinking, which clearly he embraces, since one of
his most important books is titled Either/Or. And
the oddness has a most particular flavor when he
writes about ―fellowship‖ and the
―congregation.‖
Kierkegaard works passionately for the
redemption of humankind, and for the restoration
of a Church that supports that redemption. But
he must do so by continually positing the Militant
Church against the Christianity of his time, embodied in the phrase a ―Christian nation‖ or the
―Church Triumphant,‖ both of which appear to
him to be oxymorons. Kierkegaard wants people

to return to a New Testament faith, and his way
of doing this is to wield a theology sword that divides everything ruthlessly into Christ or not
Christ. He provides a most interesting comparison to clarify what he claims for Christianity.
If there were living in the land a poet who in
view of the ideal of what it is to love talked in
the fashion: ―Alas, I must myself admit that I
cannot truly be said to be in love; neither will
I play the hypocrite and say that I am endeavoring more and more in this direction for the
truth unfortunately is that things are rather
going backward with me. Moreover, my observation convinces me that in the whole land
there is not a single person who can be said to
be truly in love‘—then the inhabitants of the
land could reply to him, and in a certain degree with justice: ―Yes, my good poet, that
may be true enough with your ideals; but we
are content, we find ourselves happy with
what we call being in love, and that settles it.‖

But, such can never be the case with Christianity‖ (my emphasis). (Articles in The Fatherland 31-32)

There is no middle ground. One cannot be content with what people prefer to call Christianity.
Kierkegaard is ruthless for Christ, which is only
befitting a philosopher theologian, one who could
never in eternity be a politician or perhaps a
bishop.
His vision of contemporary society makes
is difficult for Kierkegaard to talk about fellowship and congregation in ways that give them
much meaning or importance in one‘s day-to-day
life. Fellowship, for example, is always a lower
category than the single individual, because it‘s at
the level of the latter that we commit to a spiritual
struggle (Practice in Christianity No. III 223)
Kierkegaard is so set on reaffirming Jesus‘ message for a corrupt world that all the terms that
belong to the world he redefines in absolute
terms, like ―congregation‖: ―To apply such a
term as ‗congregation‖ (about which people busy
themselves so much these days) to this life is
really an impatient anticipation of the eternal‖ (223). Thus the congregation is merely the
collection of individuals who have gone to heaven

(223). In this language of absolutes, of either/
ors, once he‘s defined the congregation as belonging to eternity, it seems difficult to claim congregation as a living breathing group of people who,
imperfectly, seek God and goodness and wholeness in their lives.
The contrast between Kierkegaard‘s talk
about congregation starkly contrasts with the way
the Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh talks about
sangha, the Buddhist term for a ―community of
fellow practitioners‖ (Touching Peace 102). One
of the central practices of a Buddhist is to ―take
refuge‖ in—or commit to, study, and respect—
the Buddha, the Dharma (the truth), and the
Sangha (the community that lives in harmony
and awareness). For Thich Nhat Hanh, the
sangha is no other-worldly abstraction that doesn‘t exist until eternity come. Rather, it is a very
practical thing. Of it, he says ―it is difficulty or
even impossible to practice [i.e. one‘s religion]
with a sangha‖ (Touching Peace 103). Whereas
for Kierkegaard, the congregation is less a living
reality (―[it] does not really come until eternity‖)
than ―the gathering of all the single individuals
who endured in the struggle and passed the test,‖
for Thich Nhat Hanh, and presumably the Zen
Buddhist tradition in general, ―interpersonal relationships are the key for success in the practice.
Without an intimate, deep relationship with at
least one person, transformation is
unlikely‖ (Touching Peace 107). His statements
are grounded in the practical matters of making a
spiritual community work, as he describes elsewhere a time-tested process whereby brothers in
a monastery deal with anger and frustration
amongst themselves and reconcile with each
other.
For Kierkegaard—so concerned with the
Church that has become a part of the World instead of apart from the World, so cognizant of the
frailty of human beings, of their desperate attraction to comfort and their need to conform to the
World instead of to Christ—the rest of the world
must melt away. Thus ―to become and to be a
Christian is to become so turned inward that it
seems as if all the others do not exist at all for a
person, so turned inward that one is quite literally
alone in the whole world, alone before God‖ and
―every moment he is turned outward is
wasted‖ (Practice in Christianity No. III 225). Of
course, we understand what Kierkegaard is doing
with his concerned for being turned outward, be-

cause for him, such a turning is an orientation to
the values of the world. However, the word
―outward‖ never appears to refer to an actual
outward, an empirical outward, despite Kierkegaard‘s professed concern with the actual state of
the Church. Rather, it becomes part of a dialectical argument, as ―outward‖ simply becomes defined In relation to its opposite, ―inward.‖ There
is never the empirical ―outward‖ or, for that matter, an empirical ―inward.‖ This explains why
Kierkegaard is all about railing, all about struggle, all about life as a test (how the Church
merely serves as a parenthetical entity between
the time of Christ‘s death and is second coming).
According to Kierkegaard, ―the world is
going neither forward nor backward; it remains
essentially the same, like the sea, like the air, in
short, like an element. It is, namely, and must be
the element that can provide the test of being a
Christian‖ (Practice in Christianity No. III 232).
The world serves no purpose except as a test for
human salvation. When he says ―Woe, woe to the
Christian Church when it will have been victorious in this world, for then it is not he Church that
has been victorious but the world‖ (Practice in
Christianity No. III 223), he seems to be adopting
a stand about the ultimate redemption of the
world that seems to be at odds with the Catholic
notion of progression of the world toward God.
Similarly, when he says ―Christ has never wanted
to be victorious in this world. We came into the
world in order to suffer; that he called being victorious‖ (Practice in Christianity No. III 224), he
seems to assert a complete break between what is
possible in the world and what is possible in
Christ. And, admittedly, Jesus‘s own words—―My
kingdom is not of this world‖—provide heavy
support for this assertion. However, in contrast to
Kierkegaard, Catholics believe in human progress, at least according to the New Advent
Catholic Encyclopedia:
The line representing progress has its ups and
downs, there are periods of decadence and of
retrogression, and such was the period, Revelation tells us, that followed the first sin. The
human race however, began to rise again little
by little, for neither intelligence nor free willhad been destroyed by original sin and, consequently, there still remained the possibility of
material progress, whilst in the spiritual order
God did not abandon man, to whom He had
promised redemption..

Because of Kierkegaard‘s radical either/or
outlook on the world, it makes sense that he defines congregation as irrelevant until eternity
come; for him, the congregation may be too
tainted by the world to be considered something
positive outside of eternity.
If progress in human society is not possible, either as a cause or consequence of the distance at which Kierkegaard keeps the world, then
it understandable that he adopts a tone of some
severity, as he does in the following passage:
―When Christ requires us to save our life eternally (and that surely is what we propose to attain as Christians) and to hate our own life in this
world, is there then a single one among us whose
life in the remotest degree could be called even
the weakest effort in this direction‖ (38).‖
I must admit that I am suspicious of the
source of Kierkegaard‘s apparent pessimism
about the human race. I remember the story of
his impassioned but ultimately broken relationship with Regine Olsen. About one and three-quarters
years into his relation with, he wrote in his journal

it seems to me that I should have to possess the
beauty of all girls in order to draw out a
beauty equal to yours; that I should have to
circumnavigate the world in order to find the
place I lack and which the deepest mystery of
my whole being points towards, and at the
next moment you are so near to me, filling my
spirit so powerfully that I am transfigured for
myself, and feel that it's good to be here.
(shamelessly taken from the Wikipedia article

on Kierkegaard)

About a year and a half later he proposed to her,
and then before the year was up he had dissolved
the engagement. Such passions are not unusual
among young men, or perhaps any men, but
clearly Kierkegaard was a man capable of the
strongest romantic feelings. I can‘t help but feel
that he held himself to insanely high expectations
for himself in this relationship, based upon ideal
that he expresses for true love: ―The deeper the
revolution of love, the less the distinctions of mine
and yours matter, and the more ‗justice shudders‘‖ because distinctions of rightful possession
blur (Works of Love 248-249). Such ideals are
fine, but I suspect that may have provided a case
where the perfect became the enemy of the good.
I also suspect that the hypothetical poet in the
passage near the beginning of this essay was not

Kierkegaard. He is not one who could say, even
of earthly love, ―We are content, we find ourselves happy with what we call being in love, and
that settles it.‖ If Kierkegaard was uncomfortable
with intimate relationships before Regine, his
failed relationship—and lack of a serious love relationship after that—must have reinforced the
distance at which he kept the world.
Kierkegaard takes a common term (like
congregation) and redefines it to create his own
theology. It‘s safer to keep the world at a distance
by defining congregation as an aspect of eternity,
but such a strategy is only partly satisfying. The
world and Christ are defined as diametrical opposites, not observed, in all their complexity, as only
partial opposites.
One final observation about the difficulty
Kierkegaard with relationships: In the chapter
―Love Seeks Not Its Own,‖ Kierkegaard makes a
big fuss over the importance of hiding the identity
of the benefactor who might wish to say, ―‗This
man, by my help, stands on his own.‘‖ He claims
that once this statement is proclaimed in the presence of the beneficiary, ―he does not stand by
himself: then he has not in fact become his own,
then he is indebted to [the benefactor‘s]
help‖ (Works of Love 256). In other words,
Kierkegaard finds it impossible for someone who
truly loves another to openly help him become
independent. I admit that the man means well.
After all Jesus talks about not trumpeting the good
one does but doing good secretly (Matthew 6: 14). However, in reality, it‘s perfectly possible in
the context of an intimate relationship to help
someone become independent and for both benefactor and beneficiary to acknowledge this. In an
intimate relationship, the roles of benefactor and
beneficiary may switch depending on the occasion. My beloved and I may agreed that it would
be helpful to her if I reminded her how important
it is for her to get to her yoga class, so I remind
her occasionally and am openly delighted when
she remembers to go. Over a period of time, she
develops the habit of going to the class regularly
and no longer needs any encouragement or reminders. She is more independent. We can
openly acknowledge that I helped her stand on
her own. And there are other aspects of our relationship in which we can acknowledge that she
helps me stand on my own. In turn, the mutual
joy we take in assisting each other, and the self-

confidence that comes with that joy, lead to each
of us standing on our own. Kierkegaard, having
kept the world at a distance, is not versed in the
arts of worldly love that partake of the divine
Love.
I understand better now what seems odd
about Kierkegaard‘s dialectic that appears to take
on the world in a quasi-empirical fashion but in
fact takes on the absolutes that embody a harshness not really appropriate to the Christian message. Yes, becoming a Christian is entails radical
breaks from the world in many ways, and I have
no doubt that the Church in the Netherlands
needed a prophet, as does any powerful religious
institution (such as the Catholic Church), but
Kierkegaard needed a reminder about the goodness that lies with all human hearts, however
buried, and of our capacity to lean on each other,
making our weaknesses strengths.

Lonergan and Kierkegaard: Some Convergences
Richard M. Liddy

Anyone familiar with the writings of Bernard Lonergan knows his ―generous‖ interpretation of other writers. Almost invariably, in citing
others he would bring out the best in their
thought while not focusing on their shortcomings. For the most part he practiced what Paul
Ricouer would call a positive ―hermeneutics of
recovery‖ as distinct from a critical
―hermeneutics of suspicion.‖ Although on occasion he had serious disagreements with others see his criticism in of Piet Schoonenberg‘s interpretation of the early church councils - generally
he was quite generous in bringing out the positive
points in any particular writer. (Second Collection, 239ff)
I preface this short article on Lonergan
and Kierkegaard with this observation for it is obvious to me from many years of reading Lonergan
that, although he might have had his disagreements with Kierkegaard on this or that issue – for
example, the latter‘s Lutheran account of faith,
his discounting of the role of intellect, etc. – still
Lonergan pays tribute to Kierkegaard as a major
turning-point in modern philosophy and a contributor to his own – seemingly so different – philosophy.
As he put it on one occasion,
―Kierkegaard had a point.‖ (Philosophical and
Theological Papers 1965-1980, 400)
Lonergan has no book or article specifically dedicated to Kierkegaard, but he does refer
to him extensively in his Boston College ―Lectures
on Existentialism‖ from 1956 and references to
Kierkegaard are scattered throughout his writings. In these pages I would like to briefly point
out three points in Lonergan‘s own thought
where he pays tribute to Kierkegaard. I will conclude by pointing to the notion of love where
some discern convergences between the two writers. The article will consist mostly of quotes from
Lonergan that touch upon Kierkegaard. These are
―explorations‖ that might form the basis of a future article.
The convergences we discern between the
two writers are, then:
1) Kierkegaard as representing the move

toward interiority in modern philosophy,
what Lonergan calls the third stage of
meaning;
2) Kierkegaard‘s highlighting of the importance of authenticity; and
3) the central role of conversion in
Kierkegaard;
4) the notion of love in Kierkegaard and
Lonergan.
1. Kierkegaard and the Third Stage of Meaning
According to Lonergan, human culture
has moved through three major stages in the development of culture. The first stage is the stage
of common sense: that is, the stage in which everything is related to one‘s own particular culture
and spatio-temporal framework. Anything beyond that is spoken of symbolically, through poetry, metaphor, etc. This is the stage where most
people reside most of the time.
The universal style is symbolic. Its language is
instinct with feeling. At its liveliest it is poetry. At its profoundest it is rhetoric. It lacks
neither attention to detail nor keen insight nor
balanced judgment nor responsible decision.
But it has all these, not stripped of feeling, but
permeated with feeling. The calm, the detachment, the clarity, the coherence, the rigor of
the logician, the mathematician, the scientist these are just beyond its horizon. Such by and
large is the language of the New Testament
which employs parable and aphorism and
apocalyptic to shift thought and meaning
from man's everyday world to the world of
religious meaning. Such also in the main was
the language of the Church Fathers, and down
the ages it has remained the straightforward
simple language of mainstream Christianity.
(―Questionnaire on Philosophy,‖ Philosophical
and Theological Papers 1965-1980, 363)

However, according to Lonergan, the
Greek philosophers represent the move to a
whole new stage of meaning, that is, the stage of
theory. Theory seeks clarity through universal
and univocally defined terms. Remember Socra-

tes‘ driving people crazy in his quest for universal
definitions. Such a world of theory – achieved
quintessentially first in Aristotle‘s philosophy and
then in the modern sciences – goes beyond common sense‘s relating of things to ourselves by
seeking the relationships of things to each other
in an explanatory framework. Mathematical
physics is the quintessential example of such a
world of theory. The search for theoretical understanding even influenced the Christian church
as councils used theoretical terminology in order
to protect the truths of the Christian faith. Think
of the term ―homoousios‖ (―consubstantial‖)
which the Council of Nicea used to express the
divinity of Christ. Think also of Thomas Aquinas
employing Aristotelian theory to articulate a systematic account of Christian theology.
This second stage of meaning, the stage of
theory, found its apogee in the massive theoretical constructs of modern science. Beginning with
Descartes and especially with Immanuel Kant,
however, a new stage of meaning began to
emerge, that is, the world of interiority. While
common sense people and theoreticians both
sought to excel in their own realms, modern philosophers began to ask how it was possible that
both of these worlds emerged from the human
person. Naturally they were led to ask: Who is
this person from which these realms proceed?
What was it in human interiority, in human consciousness, that makes possible the emergence of
the realm of common sense and the world of theory? What is it about human consciousness, human subjectivity, the ―I‖ at the center of human
operations, that makes the emergence of these
worlds possible?
It was in within this modern context of the
turn toward interiority that Soren Kierkegaard
began to insist on authenticity and on faith. The
following quote from Lonergan highlights Kierkegaard‘s role within the emergence of modern philosophy.
The absolute idealist, Hegel, brilliantly explores whole realms of meaning; he gives poor
marks to naive realists; but he fails to advance
to a critical realism, so that Kierkegaard can
complain that what is logical also is static, that
movement cannot be inserted into a logic, that
Hegel's system has room not for existence (self
-determining freedom) but only for the idea of
existence.

Kierkegaard marks a trend. Where he was
concerned with faith, Nietzsche was with
power, Dilthey with concrete human living,
Husserl with the constitution of our intending,
Bergson with his elan vital, Blondel with action, American pragmatists with results, European existentialists with authentic subjectivity.
While the mathematicians were discovering
that their axioms were not self-evident truths,
while the physicists were discovering that
their laws were not inevitable necessities but
verifiable possibilities, the philosophers ceased
to think of themselves as the voice of pure reason and began to be the representatives of
something far more concrete and human.
(Method in Theology, 264-265)

This move to interiority has implications
for Christianity and Christian theology and
Kierkegaard played a key role in the emergence of
this modern cultural consciousness. For example,
during the Second Vatican Council it became evident to many that doctrine and theology are expressions of something more fundamental, that is,
the encounter with the living Christ. Theologians
such as Dominique Marie Chenu stated that those
who insist on putting doctrine first put the cart
before the horse; the first thing is encountering
the living Jesus. The Words of the Good Shepherd
come before doctrine. If one begins with doctrine, one can reduce the pastoral to doctrine –
―the simplifications and clarifications of classical
oratory.‖
But what comes first is the word of God. The
task of the church is the kerygma, announcing
the good news, preaching the gospel. That
preaching is pastoral. It is the concrete reality.
From it one may abstract doctrines, and theologians may work the doctrines into conceptual systems. But the doctrines and systems,
however valuable and true, are but the skeleton of the original message. A word is the
word of a person, but doctrine objectifies and
deperson-alizes. The word of God comes to us
through the God-man. The church has to mediate to the world not just a a doctrine but the
living Christ.‖ (A Third Collection, 227-228)

2. Kierkegaard and Authenticity
In his Boston College ―Lectures on Existentialism‖ from 1956 Lonergan described the fundamental thrust of modern existentialist philosophy by using an example from contemporary
politics. At that time President Eisenhower was
asked why American troops had to join the British

in invading the Suez Canal and he replied, ―Well,
we have to be men.‖ Lonergan connected that
expression, ―we have to be men,‖ with the whole
thrust of existentialist philosophy beginning with
Kierkegaard and flowing into secularist existentialist philosophers of the 20th century.
The question is: what does it mean to be a
man? To be myself? Not just a ―substance‖ like
very other human being, but a ―subject,‖ my
―self,‖ a conscious being with a history, needs,
desires, etc.? What does it mean to be myself
truly? That is, authentically? What is such authenticity?
Such a question has social implications,
that is, what does it mean to be who I profess to
be? What does it mean to be a genuine Dane? A
genuine Christian? It is this question that forms
the backdrop for many of the formulations that
Lonergan gave to his own work during his later
years. Let me give one such formulation.
As Kierkegaard asked whether he was a Christian, so divers men can ask themselves
whether or not they are genuine Catholics or
Protestants, Muslims or Buddhists, Platonists
or Aristotelians, Kantians or Hegelians, artists
or scientists, and so forth. Now they may answer that they are, and their answers may be
correct. But they can also answer affirmatively
and still be mistaken. In that case there will
exist a series of points in which they are what
the ideals of the tradition demand, but there
will be another series in which there is a
greater or less divergence. These points of divergence are overlooked from a selective inattention, or from a failure to understand, or
from an undetected rationalization. What I am
is one thing, what a genuine Christian or Buddhist is, is another, and I am unaware of the
difference. My unawareness is unexpressed. I
have no language to express what I am, so I
use the language of the tradition I unauthentically appropriate, and thereby I devaluate,
distort, water down, corrupt that language.
Such devaluation, distortion, corruption may
occur only in scattered individuals. But it may
occur on a more massive scale, and then the
words are repeated, but the meaning is gone.
The chair was still the chair of Moses, but it
was occupied by the scribes and Pharisees.
The theology was still scholastic, but the scholasticism was decadent. The religious order

still read out the rules, but one wonders
whether the home fires were still burning. The
sacred name of science may still be invoked
but, as Edmund Husserl has argued, all significant scientific ideals can vanish to be replaced by the conventions of a clique. So the
unauthenticity of individuals becomes the unauthenticity of a tradition. Then, in the measure a subject takes the tradition, as it exists,
for his standard, in that measure he can do no
more than authentically realize unauthenticity. (Method in Theology, 80-81)

According to Lonergan, then, following up
on Kierkegaard‘s point, there are two types of authenticity. Minor authenticity regards the individual in relation to the community in which he has
been brought up. Major authenticity, on the
other hand, regards the authenticity of the community itself in the light of history – or in the
light of God.
There is the minor authenticity or unauthenticity of the subject with respect to the tradition that nourishes him. There is the major
authenticity that Justifies or condemns the
tradition itself in the first case there is passed
a human judgment on subjects. In the second
case history and, ultimately, divine providence
pass judgment on traditions. (Method in Theology, 80)

3. Kierkegaard and the Process of Conversion
On several occasions Lonergan called attention to the parallel between his own categories
and those of Kierkegaard. His own major categories involve the personal identification of the
various levels of human conscious activity: experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding.
These levels of conscious activity are reflected in
the three levels of the social-cultural world where
Lonergan distinguishes particular goods
(corresponding to experiencing), the good of order (corresponding to understanding) and value
(corresponding to judging and deciding).
After setting these out in Lectures on Existentialism Lonergan draws the analogy between
his own three-fold division and Kierkegaard‘s
three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. For Kierkegaard, the aesthetic sphere, symbolized by the character of Don
Juan, is focused on pleasures and satisfactions.
Paradoxically, the more one seeks happiness

within this horizon, the less happy one becomes.
It is only through personal transformation, accompanied by angst, that one is able to make a
leap to the ethical sphere, the sphere that requires
a correspondence between one‘s reason and one‘s
behavior. Finally, it is only through realizing
one‘s ethical powerlessness that one turns in faith
to the religious level and takes one‘s stand before
God in history. Lonergan called attention to the
incommensurability of these levels and the clear
articulation of these distinctions by Kierkegaard.
Now these philosophical differences will radiate through the whole of life. Earlier, we considered three levels of the good: the particular
good (the level of satisfactions), the good of
order, and value. We distinguished aesthetic,
ethical, and religious values, where the aesthetic value is apprehended by insight into the
concrete, the ethical value is the individual
demanding correspondence between his rationality and his activity, and the religious
value is the rational individual using truth to
know being, orienting himself before God
within the world and history.
The distinction of the aesthetic, the ethical,
and the religious comes, of course, from
Kierkegaard. He used the three categories in
speaking of three spheres of existential subjectivity. A person moves from one sphere to
another only by a leap. In other words, when
a person is within a given sphere of existential
subjectivity, as Kierkegaard would put it, or
within a given horizon, to use the terminology
we developed earlier, then it is not by arguing
from that sphere that one will bring him to
another sphere. That sphere becomes a closed
system, and a person has to be dynamited out
of it. (Topics in Education, 179)

To put the issue in other terms: how does
one escape from Plato‘s cave? Just by ―being
told‖ about the world outside? Lonergan says
that Plato set himself a tremendous problem when
he realized that getting out of the cave was not
just a matter of imparting information. And that
is why he wrote his dialogues – he had to persuade people to allow themselves to be put in a
position to be pulled out of the cave. They had to
be persuaded to make some decisions: decisions
that in the context of people‘s present circumstances involved anxiety and fear.
It is easy to introduce a new viewpoint, a
higher viewpoint on the side of the object, as

does when he distinguishes between the sensible and the intelligible…But when Plato wants
to convert people to the noeta as what really
exists, he has quite a job on his hands. He has
to write a series of highly literary dialogues
and to introduce the myth of the cave in order
to explain what he means. And even when he
gets his meaning across, it is quite another
thing for people to live according to those
principles. (Phenomenology and Logic, 289)

Anxiety – existential angst - arises as soon
as you start facing the possibility of changing
what so far has been a successful concrete synthesis in your living.
When a person has one's living organized on a
lower level, the movement to a higher level
involves something like the apparent eruption
of a latent power, the possibility of a radical
discovery, where the discovered has been present all along -but where there has been a
hiding of what has been discovered. These
notions of obnubilation, discovery, uncovering
what has been there all along, conversion,
transformation of one's living, are all right in
the center of existentialism, and they lead to
the most fundamental questions that can be
raised with regard to the philosophic enterprise. (Phenomenology and Logic, 244-246)

There is need, then, for a leap from one level to
the next. You can‘t pull yourself up by the bootstraps. You can‘t change yourself by just taking
thought. And, Lonergan notes, this analysis is
relevant to divisions among scholastic theologians. That, he notes, was the existential issue that
concerned him the most: theology was his central
issue. ―That is where the shoe pinches‖ Conversion involves a change in that concrete
synthesis. It means that living is organized in
a new way, in the light of new concepts, new
principles, new norms of action, new modes
of response to situations, new types of interests, new orientations. (Phenomenology and
Logic, 289)

There is then, an ―existential gap,‖ that is,
a difference between what I think I am and what
I truly am. This is the line between the docta ignorantia, that is, the questions which have a
meaning for me even though I don‘t know the
answers to them and the indocta ignorantia, that
is, the vast world of questions about which ―I
couldn‘t care less.‖ The issue is a spiritual one:

Sources Cited
am I going to be open to where questions are
leading me? Really?
It would seem that formational processes,
such as ―12 Step‖ programs or the Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius are oriented to helping the
subject to such openness of spirit. Or, as Lonergan once put it when asked about how conversion happens, ―You get converted by being kicked
around.‖
4. Lonergan and Kierkegaard on Love:
Recently, at a Lonergan workshop at Boston College, David Aiken, Professor of Philosophy
at Gordon College and Sarah Pike Cabral, Doctoral Candidate at Loyola College, Chicago, gave a
workshop on ―The Dynamics of Love in Kierkegaard and Lonergan.‖ The description of their
workshop described the subtle differences and
conjunctions between Kierkegaard and Lonergan
on the subject of love.
Lonergan‘s preoccupation with spiritual eros
is perhaps the most salient aspect of his philosophy. Though it goes by many names – the
pure and unrestricted desire to know, the
natural desire to see God, the dynamism of the
human subject, the notion of being, or simply
―exigence‖ – it underwrites virtually every
page of Lonergan‘s voluminous authorship.
Kierkegaard, for his part, recognizes the allencompassing sway of this desire only to subject it to radical delimitation by pointing out
its paradoxical character – namely, that as
emblematic of our fallenness and offense at
God‘s unsolicited generosity, the eros of the
human mind ineluctably strives for its own
downfall. Would it be just, then, to characterize Lonergan as an apostle of exigent eros and
Kierkegaard as an apostle of unmerited agape?
As Treebeard might caution us,―Not so hasty!‖
For by examining the fine print of each authorship we discover that Kierkegaardian eros
is by no means unambiguously vicious – indeed, it provides essential clues for apprehending God‘s unrestricted generosity – and
that Lonergan acknowledges this very agape
as the Alpha and Omega of a universal drive
to self-transcendence.
(From privately
printed announcement of workshop)

This is a subject – the subject of love in Lonergan
and Kierkegaard – about which I wish to learn
more.
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Kierkegaard’s Attack upon Assistant Professors:
Proof of the Importance of Systematic Theology
Lawrence B. Porter, Ph.D.
I have always been interested in learning
more about Kierkegaard because, though he
looms as an important figure in modern Christian
thought, my education has provided me with very
limited exposure to him. As an undergraduate
English major I once was assigned to read his Fear
and Trembling as an example of 19th-century romantic, that is, emotive, anti-rational and perhaps overly imaginative, interpretation of an ancient text (the account in the book of Genesis of
the patriarch Abraham‘s near sacrificial slaying
of his son Isaac). But in all my studies at a Catholic seminary, Kierkegaard was referred to only in
passing. Nor was he treated significantly in my
graduate studies at a non-denominational Protestant divinity school. However, despite his absence
from the curriculum at that divinity school, more
than once I saw evidence there of Kierkegaard‘s
influence upon faculty and students. For example, an evangelical student, a friend of mine, was
always reading Kierkegaard for spiritual comfort.
I seem to recall him always accompanied by a
copy of Kierkegaard‘s Training in Christianity. On
the other hand, one of my professors at that same
school, a man of pronounced liberal theological
persuasion, more than once made reference to
Kierkegaard‘s scornful attacks upon
―Christendom‖ and its clergy as support for that
professor‘s own disdain for the Church, that is,
any form of organized Christianity. And so when
I saw the announcement that Seton Hall University‘s Center for Catholic Studies‘ ―faculty summer seminar 2008‖ would have as its theme
―Kierkegaard and/or Catholicism: A Matter of
Conjunctions,‖ I was eager to attend.
While I found Dean Cahoy‘s lectures in
this seminar illuminating especially as regards
Kierkegaard‘s critique of Hegelian rationalism, I
was not impressed by the assigned readings from
Kierkegaard. In fact, initially I found them personally offensive—his attacks upon organized
religion and academic professionals could not
help but annoy someone like myself who is an
ordained minister and a professor. But the more
important thing is that on further consideration I
found Kierkegaard‘s arguments intellectually unconvincing and representative of a kind of pietism that I feel is particularly dangerous not just
for the Christian faith but for society in general.

That is, while Kierkegaard‘s critique of Hegel‘s
gross rationalization of Christianity may be at
times quite cogent, Kierkegaard‘s alternative to
philosophical idealism, his own biblical fideism, is
an even more dangerous distortion of Christianity
than Hegel‘s rationalism. More precisely, Kierkegaard‘s constant appeal to blind faith and his
deprecation of the merely human in contrast to
the truly Christian constitutes an invitation to
mindless religious fanaticism and denies to Christian faith a major apologetic tool, namely, its ability to appeal to what is most noble and most reasonable in human nature, its moral idealism and
rational capacity for genuine insight.
I would like to illustrate this judgment
with reference to the assigned readings,
starting with Kierkegaard‘s writings on love. We
were given several selections from Kierkegaard‘s

Works of Love: Some Christian Reflections in the
Form of Discourses (translated by Howard and
Edna Hong, New York: Harper and Row, 1962).
In those readings, Kierkegaard constantly contrasts Christian love with human love, ―love . . .
which is weak indulgence‖ with ―the love of
which Christianity speaks‖ (p. 25), the ―purely
human conception of love‖ (p. 169) over and
against the infinitely superior Christian love,
more precisely what Kierkegaard calls that
―Christian love [which] goes from heaven to
earth‖ (p.169) as distinguished from the all-toohuman ―friendship and erotic love‖ which proceed ―from the ground up‖ (p. 249). I wonder if
Kierkegaard‘s polarization, not to say caricature,
of erotic love as simply desire for possession and
Christian love as purely self-sacrificing love was
the inspiration for Swedish theologian Anders
Nygren‘s famous two-volume study called Eros
and Agape (1930,1936) in which the author
analyzes the connotations of two Greek words for
love, eros as sexual love and agape as unconditional love and concludes that agape alone is truly
Christian. In contrast, Pope Benedict XVI in his
first encyclical, Deus Caritas Est, in typically
Catholic fashion, argues quite the opposite, that
is, he insists both eros and agape are aspects of
divine love.
By mentioning the current pope, I do not mean to
appeal to authority here. Rather, one can ration-

ally argue it is patently observable, indeed, common experience that erotic attraction does not
always lead to physical aggression. Instead, more
often erotic attraction is a motive for tenderness
rather than aggression, as when a young man‘s
strong attraction to a shapely young woman leads
him not to impose himself upon her but rather to
try to win her attention and favor by acts of kindness and gentlemanly behavior on his part. This
is an example of grace building upon human nature, a human nature that is not totally perverse.
But Kierkegaard is loath to give any recognition to
the decency of any purely human motive. Take
for example his critique of charitable contributions: ―Because one makes charitable contributions, because one visits the widow and clothes
the naked—his love is not necessarily demonstrated or made recognizable in such deeds, for
one can perform works of love in an unloving,
yes, even in a self-loving way, and when this is
so, the works of love are nevertheless not the
work of love.‖ Once again, Kierkegaard fails to
recognize that human self-interest need not be
entirely selfish but can lead to virtuous, even
Christian actions. In this regard, it is only appropriate to note how the modern state uses the incentive of tax deductions to transform otherwise
miserly citizens into generous benefactors of the
community. This is yet another example of how
grace can build upon nature when an appeal to
self-interest can result in virtuous behavior. But
Kierkegaard does not believe in the possibility of
virtue only in what he feels is the power of blind
faith.
Indeed, Kierkegaard‘s appeal to blind faith
is yet another prominent and inappropriate element in his considerations on love. For it is not
just that Kierkegaard cannot acknowledge the
strange mixture of good and evil, of self interest
and generosity in each person, he also denies us
the use of our rational faculties. I am referring to
how Kierkegaard, in these his writings on love,
constantly ridicules discretion and judgment as
―fastidiousness‖ (p.160, 161, 162, 163) and insists that ―love is rather the closed eye of forbearance and gentleness, the closed eye which does
not see defects and imperfections,‖ (p. 159).
Such an attitude is an invitation to tragedy as it
was for Regine Olsen who should have exercised
more discretion, more discernment when she first
met this brilliant young Dane with an infinite capacity for intellectual debate but no capacity for

emotional commitment. One needs to use one‘s
brain, one needs to be intelligent and discerning
in the ways of love, making important judgments
all along the way.
Something more can be learned from
Kierkegaard‘s attack upon the church and the
academy, organized religion and university professors. These attacks appeared in 21 articles
written for The Fatherland, the daily newspaper
in Copenhangen from Dec. 18, 1854 to May 26,
1855 (they are collected in Kierkegaard‘s work
called Attack Upon Christendom, trans. By Walter
Lowrie (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, and in Practice in Christianity, No. III, trans. by Howard and
Edna Hong, Princeton, 1991) and in another series of articles which Kierkegaard published
shortly after the completion of his series in the
Fatherland, but now in a broadsheet funded by
Kierkegaard himself which he called The Moment
or The Instant (these are collected in his Journals
and Papers, Vol. 2, F-K, edited and translated by
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Bloomington
and London: Indiana University Press, 1970).
While the articles in both The Fatherland and The
Moment are written in patently journalistic fashion, that is, often in the form of savage satire, that
crude form must not be allowed to obscure the
fact that Kierkegaard was utterly sincere in all he
wrote therein, that is, he was setting forth sincere
intellectual and religious convictions.
In the January 29, 1855 issue of The Fatherland, Kierkegaard published an article entitled, ―The Point at Issue with Bishop Martensen.‖
There Kierkegaard vents a veritable paroxysm of
rage against a Danish Lutheran bishop who gave
the eulogy at the funeral of another Danish
bishop, one Mynster. Kierkegaard was upset because Martensen had praised Mynster at his funeral as ―a witness to the truth.‖ In one sense,
Kierkegaard‘s attack upon Martensen is pathetic
and inappropriate. To this day eulogies of the
dead often tend to be unrealistic idealizations of
the dear departed. Moreover, I cannot share
Kierkegaard‘s moral indignation at the fact that
the king of Denmark had bestowed upon Bishop
Mynster ―the accolade of knighthood‖ (p. 21)
when in my time the monarchy of England has
done the same for rock stars Mick Jagger, Elton
John, Paul McCartney, Ringo Starr, and U2 singer
Bono.

In another sense, however, something can
be said in favor of Kierkegaard‘s critique of bourgeois religion and, more precisely, the state
Church of Denmark. Here I can agree, at least in
part. For example, I do not think
―Constantinianism,‖ that is, state-sponsored, established religion, is a healthy option for Christianity whether Catholic or Protestant. The Catholic Church has never truly flourished under state
sponsorship, instead, state sponsorship of Catholicism—whether their ―Catholic Majesties‖ in
Spain or their ―Apostolic Majesties‖ in Austria—
has always proven more counter-productive than
truly supportive. Indeed, if contemporary Mexico
is any example, the church has always benefited
more from persecution by the state rather than
support from the state. Also, to some degree I can
identify with Kierkegaard‘s criticism of bourgeois
Christianity. I have in mind the politically correct, socially accommodated, ―preeminently reasonable‖ Christianity of contemporary, American
Catholic politicians such as Giuliani, Pelosi and
Kennedy. However, after having said all this I
also think it is important to be balanced when
making such a judgment about the faith or sincerity of individuals. Even among Jesus‘ hand
picked inner circle there is observable varying
degrees of commitment, besides the loyalty of
John the beloved disciple to the very end (Jn
19.25-26), there is also the treachery of Judas (Jn
13.21-30), the waffling of Peter (Jn 13.36-38),
the doubting of Thomas (Jn 20.24-25) and the
incomprehension of Philip (John 14.9, ―Have I
been with you for so long a time and you still do
not know me, Philip?‖ In pointing to these multiple biblical references I am trying to be comprehensive and systematic in my theologizing. That
is, I am trying to be ―scientific‖ in the sense of
systematically taking account of all the available
evidence. Good theology must do that. Anything
less is sheer opportunism, or worse, dishonesty,
purely adventitious and manipulative, Biblequoting. Unfortunately, this is often what I find
Kierkegaard is doing. All too often Kierkegaard
refuses to be comprehensive and systematic and
instead arbitrarily insists upon seeing everything
in terms of radical polarities, moral antitheses.
For Kierkegaard there are only ―true Christians‖
and false Christians or what he prefers to call
hypocrites. But the truth is much more complex
and the gospels, as we have seen, make it clear
there is a considerable variety among Christians:
there are deeply committed Christians, lukewarm

Christians, nominal Christians, uncomprehending Christians, to name but a few.
A more pointed illustration of this is
Kierkegaard‘s opportunistic and manipulative use
of the Bible in his attack upon clergy and academics in his September 22, 1855 essay
―Imitation‖ (it first appeared in The Moment and
is now in Journals and Papers , Vol.2, F-K, trans
by H. and E. Hong, Indiana University Press,
1970) and a collection of short essays collected
under the general title ―Professor‖ (in Journals
and Papers, Vol. 3, L-R, pages 634-657). Not
only are assistant professors referred to in the
―Imitation‖ as ―animal-creatures‖ (p.375) but in
the ―Professor‖ the academic professional is variously and continually pilloried in such statements
as ―the professor is the greatest satire on the
‗apostle‘‖ (p. 638) and ―the assistant professor is
a non-human‖ (p. 654). The scientific study of
religion is mocked in ―Imitation‖ as ―an insuperable mass of historical and learned nonsense‖ (p.373), and in ―Professor‖ as ―speculative
effeminacy‖ (p. 635), ―scholarship of evil‖ (p.
657), and ―erudite, learned nonsense‖ (p. 656).
Indeed, Kierkegaard accuses professors of having
―invented scholarship in order to evade doing
God‘s will‖ (p. 657). Moreover, he proposes as
an alternative to such pernicious scholarship his
formation of Bible study groups: ―If there are five
or six like-minded people who together with me
and without any solemn ceremonies will pledge
themselves simply to try to understand the New
Testament and simply strive to express its demands in action, I propose to start religious meetings in which I will interpret the new testament.‖
I quote Kierkegaard at length here because his
use of the word ―simply‖ is particularly revealing.
Even earlier Kierkegaard had suggested we
should ―take the New Testament and read it directly and simply‖ (p. 637). But the problem is:
nothing in the Bible is that simple. Quite the contrary, all the words of Jesus cry out for learned,
historically informed, interpretation.
An example of this is Kierkegaard‘s exaltation of ―Christian poverty‖ over and against the
idea that a Christian teacher should be paid. In
his March 1855 article in The Fatherland entitled,
―What do I want?‖ he says: ―A teacher is paid, let
us say, several thousand. If then we suppress the
Christian standard and apply the ordinary human
rule, that it is a matter of course a man should

receive a wage for his labor, a wage sufficient to
support a family, and a considerable wage to enable him to enjoy the consideration due to a government official—then a few thousand a year is
certainly not much. On the other hand, as soon
as the Christian requirement of poverty is
brought to bear, family is a luxury, and several
thousand is very high pay,‖ (p. 38 Attack upon
Christendom, 1966).
This passage is replete with irony, the
irony that Kierkegaard never held a paying job in
his life and instead lived off of a substantial inheritance and those very reasons was able to publish many more books and essays than most professors might ever hope to publish. But the more
serious problem is Kierkegaard‘s abuse of Christian doctrine regarding wealth and poverty. The
NT witness on the subject of money is abundant,
and, at times, apparently conflicting. But if that
witness is systematically surveyed, a balanced,
logical argument becomes evident. More precisely, no doubt, at times Jesus does indeed severely criticize inordinate wealth especially when
it makes us neglectful of our neighbor as in Mark
10.23, ―how hard it is for the rich to enter the
kingdom of heaven.‖ And no doubt in one place
at least Jesus invites a disciple to give up all his
wealth and embrace poverty, his advice to the
rich young man in Mk 10.17-27. However, we
must also consider we have considerable evidence
that suggests Jesus readily accepted and was
grateful for financial support for himself and his
work which he received from wealthy patrons:
Jesus accepted the support of wealthy women
such as ―Joanna the wife of Chuza, the manager
of Herod‘s household‖ (Lk 8.3), it was another
wealthy patron who supplied the place for the
last supper, ―a large upper room, well furnished‖ (Lk 22.12), and, when Jesus dines with
the wealthy Zaccheus, He pronounces a blessing
on that man‘s house (Lk 19). We must also consider the evidence that Jesus was exquisitely sensitive to the issue of just compensation for laborers and strongly endorsed what Kierkegaard calls,
―the ordinary human rule‖ that one should receive wages for one‘s labor. In this regard it is
important to note: it was Jesus and not Karl Marx
who insisted ―the laborer is worthy of his
hire‖( Luke 10.7). Moreover, in 1Cor 9.7-11,
Saint Paul applies the teaching of Jesus on just
compensation of workers for Paul‘s own defense
of clergy compensation: ―Who serves as a soldier
at his own expense? Who plants a vineyard

without eating any of its fruit? Who tends a flock
without getting some of the milk? Do I say this
on human authority? Does not the law say the
same? For it is written in the law of Moses, ―You
shall not muzzle an ox, when it is treading out
the grain.‖ Is it for oxen that God is concerned?
Does he not speak entirely for our sake? It was
written for our sake, because the plowman should
plow in hope and the thresher thresh in hope of a
share in the crop. If we have sown spiritual good
among you, is it too much if we reap your material benefits?‖
In view of all this, it is obvious Kierkegaard‘s attack on the modest wages of assistant
professors and their diligent efforts to improve
their lot in life (to publish articles so as to earn
tenure and promotion) is an arbitrary, purely adventitious, one could even say malicious, employment of select passages from the gospel. Struggling academics deserve encouragement rather
than savage attack. Indeed, God bless those assistant, associate and full professors who can challenge self-styled prophets who use the Bible to
their own ends (false prophets were a constant
problem in ancient Israel—see Is 9.15, Jer 14.14,
Ezk 13.3--and in NT times—see Mk 13.22,
2Peter 2.1, 1Jn 4.1). God bless those academics
whose learned distinctions can challenge and
keep honest, curb the excesses of, popular
preachers, and amateur exegetes eager to lead
others in study of the Bible. Kierkegaard himself
needs to be cautioned: the truth can rarely be
caste in such simplistic formulas as either/or or
―both/and‖, instead the bible and the NT especially makes it clear the truth is often a very complex thing requiring not blind or impulsive engagement but careful analysis and discernment,
contemplation even, before commitment to any
definitive conclusions.
And so in the end, I must conclude it is
better that we ignore Kierkegaard‘s fideistic, voluntaristic plea ―just believe it‖ (Professor, p.647),
and instead adopt the example of the Blessed Virgin Mary who, when the angel Gabriel confronts
her with his mind-boggling message, does not
respond with mindless enthusiasm, ―Hallelujah,
Praise the Lord.‖ Instead, Mary responds with a
sober and challenging question, ―But how can
this be since I do not know man?‖ (Lk 1.34). It is
only after she gets an answer to that important
question that she says, ―Behold, I am the humble
servant of the Lord.‖ Similarly, we would do well

to take seriously the apostle Peter‘s instruction:
―be ready to give a reason for the hope that is
within you‖ (1Peter 3.15). No wonder Peter has
been called by some ―the prince of the apostles!‖
Conversion to Christ must involve the whole person, one‘s mind as well as one‘s heart. It is important to appeal as much to the mind as to the
heart of potential or less than perfect believers.

The Idea of Order in Soren Kierkegaard
John P. Wargacki

She sang beyond the genius of the sea.
The water never formed to mind or voice,
Like a body wholly body, fluttering
Its empty sleeves; and yet its mimic motion
Made constant cry, caused constantly a cry, That
was not ours although we understood, Inhuman,
of the veritable ocean.
Wallace Stevens
Thus begins Wallace Stevens‘ ―The Idea of
Order at Key West,‖ in which the imaginary figure of the singing woman on the shore serves as
the central trope in the poet‘s endless quest for
meaning, order, and beauty in ―A Universe of
death.‖1 The complex enterprises of Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard and often obtuse
musings of American poet Wallace Stevens intersect at the point of an artificial order – not in
terms of the order necessarily being unreal but
rather that this order, by definition, is artifice: a
creation of the human imagination designed, in
the case of Kierkegaard, to impose meaning upon
paradox; or, in the case of Stevens, to impose the
―idea of order‖ on a human existence predicted
upon disorder and chaos. Neither example, neither quest will provide answers to metaphysical
or spiritual mysteries; neither is able to do more
than to find or invent a pattern of reason behind
the absurdity. The central difference is the way
in which the philosopher ultimately manages to
embrace a paradox that the poet cannot. Their
connection then is not so much the result, but
rather the journey and the language each must
use to facilitate it.
For Stevens, the fiercest anti-Christian
poet of the American Modernists (perhaps the
most anti-Christian in the entire western canon),
his brilliant and poignant ―The Idea of Order at
Key West,‖ keenly illustrates his reliance upon a
resemblance of a reality – the poetry he often described as ―The Supreme Fiction.‖ For Stevens,
even the act of writing poetry was always, in
some way, about poetics itself, and the result,
though admittedly a complete fiction. An illusion
without substance, it was, nonetheless necessary
to human survival. Stevens, with only language
at his disposal, replaces the notion of a ―Supreme
Being‖ (God), with a ―Supreme Fiction‖ (poetry).2

While in Key West,3 Stevens rediscovered
that the sheer beauty of nature, which one can
behold, ponder, and use for inspiration, nevertheless did not compensate for the absence of real
love and coherence in the universe of profound
emotional suffering. While his own ―Blessed
Rage for Order‖ becomes an impossible cry for a
teleological existence in a present-tense world
devoid of meaning, his imaginary ―she‖ seems
able to reduce the mighty sea to a mere seascape
of her own creation – a footnote overshadowed
by her song,
For she was the maker of the song she sang.
The ever-hooded, tragic-gestured sea
Was merely a place by which she walked to
sing.
(15-17)

Here Stevens wrestles against this paradox of
beauty and nature. His attempt to manufacture
order rages against reality while the creation of
verse serves to displace the sensory existence and
emotional abandonment with an imaginary
dream -- his own ―supreme‖ but nonetheless unreal ―fiction.‖ Kierkegaard, meanwhile, in so
many ways, relies upon his own version of the
―supreme fiction.‖ Yet if Stevens‘s result is the
fiction of an unbeliever, it nevertheless represents
that awkward but often sublime matrix of poetry
and philosophy, as the two alternate universes –
Kierkegaard‘s and Stevens‘s bend and sometimes
break the artifice of language to express the unutterable: the paradoxical mystery of Eternal Love,
the reality of God.
For Stevens then all reality, even language,
is mythic; ―the tomb in Palestine‖ remains ―…the
grave of Jesus where he lay,‖ he concludes in
Sunday Morning, perhaps the most blatantly antiChristian poem of the 20th Century. Still he cannot help but puzzle over and struggle against
what human mind and the human heart can both
create but, perhaps, never realize – ―an idea of
order‖ only. He concludes:
Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know,
Why, when the singing ended and we turned
Toward the town, tell why the glassy lights,
The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there,

As the night descended, tilting in the air,
Mastered the night and portioned out the sea,
Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles,
Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.

God‘s love, expressed most paradoxically in the
Incarnation - even when the tropical night is cold
and the dark sky and sea are impossible to distinguish.

Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,
The maker's rage to order words of the sea,
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred,
And of ourselves and of our origins,
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds.
(44-55)

Endnotes

In his ―Works of Love‖ and elsewhere, Kierkegaard‘s philosophy demands so much more of his
words, and he demands so much more than a
mere ―idea‖ -- even in terms of his own deep
personal struggles:
What wonderful recollections the lover acquires as thanks for all his labour! Ina sense
he can pack his whole life together in a dash.
He can say: I have laboured in spite of everyone, early and late, but what have I accomplished – a dash!...I have suffered as heavily as
any man, inwardly as only love can suffer, but
what have I gained – a dash! (259-60)

Stevens must be content with a dash, and thrust
his existence thoroughly into the only semblance
of truth: a ―fiction,‖ an ―idea of order.‖ The
paradox of ―a happy people in an unhappy
world--‖4 is beyond comprehension, it is beyond
belief, utterly hopeless, and worse, it cannot be
made whole even by language. Kierkegaard,
seemingly undaunted by the same paradox, unwittingly retorts, reiterating:
Is, then, the life of the lover wasted, has he
lived entirely in vain, Since there is nothing,
absolutely nothing, which witnesses to his
work? Answer: is seeking one‘s own the wasting of one‘s life? No, in truth, this life is not
wasted. This the lover knows in blessed joy in
himself and with God…he is completely and
wholly transformed into being simply an active power in the hands of God. (260)

As St. John of the Cross came to realize in ―Dark
Night of Soul,‖5 God (Christ) forms both nexus
and solution to paradox – the paradox of being
completely alone in the universe, even insomuch
as to create a woman who might sing ―beyond the
genius of the sea,‖ but who cannot replace a
woman‘s flesh and blood. The transformation,
Kierkegaard reminds us, is not in the ―supreme
fiction‖ but in the ―supreme truth‖ – the reality of

1. In John Milton‘s Paradise Lost, Satan describes hell, or Pandemonium, as: A
A Universe of death, which God by curse Created evil,
for evil only good.(Book II 622-23).
2. A vice president for the Hartford Insurance company, Stevens‘s domestic life was, as critic
Denis Donoghue once described it, to be ―somewhere
between desolate and bleak.‖ Unsatisfied with work
alone and miserable in his marriage, Stevens‘s, an
atheist, sought solace in the writing of poetry, what he
described as ―The Supreme Fiction.‖
3. Stevens‘s many travels, especially to the
Florida Keys, often served to reinforce his that chaotic
universe can only be ordered by the imagination,
finding no satisfaction his relationships, poetry serves
Stevens as both an escape and means of survival.
4. In the final section of ―The Auroras of Autumn,‖ perhaps Stevens‘s most ambitious attempt to
create order from chaos as he observes the Northern
Lights, he presents four scenarios: ―An unhappy people in an unhappy world‖; ―A happy people in an unhappy world‖; ―A happy people in a happy world‖;
and, ―An unhappy people in a happy world,‖ all of
which he rejects as:
This contrivance of the spectre of spheres,
Contriving balance to contrive a whole,
(Stanza X)
5. St. John of the Cross, a 16th century Carmelite mystic, is considered by many critics to be the
strongest writer in the Spanish language after Miguel
De Cervantes. His ―Dark Night of the Soul,‖ written
while isolated in prison, celebrates his ―mystical union‖ with Christ expressed in sexual terms. Void of all
other human contact, the poet‘s spiritual union with
the Word Incarnate is metaphorized as secret lovers
meeting in the night.
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